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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
        hen States engage in partnered warfare, that is, collaborate at different 
degrees in the conduct of a military operation, international law prescribes a 
number of obligations that regulate the conduct of each State and their co-
operation. For instance, a State should not knowingly aid or assist another 
in the commission of a violation of international law. States should take these 
obligations into account from the outset to agree on the conditions and mo-
dalities of military collaboration, and to delimit minimum standards and 
shared interpretations that are acceptable to each party. It is essential to par-
ticipate in partnered warfare on the basis of a common understanding of the 
applicable international law framework, as each State risks bearing responsi-
bility in relation to wrongful conduct committed by a partner State. 
This article examines international obligations that arise in relation to the 
conduct of other States and analyzes how they apply and interact in the con-
text of partnered warfare. It investigates rules of State responsibility relevant 
to the context of partnered warfare (in particular, provisions on aid or assis-
tance formulated in Article 16 of the International Law Commission (ILC) 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(ARSIWA)),1 as well as a number of primary norms that impose obligations 
connected to the conduct of others (including general humanitarian law and 
human rights law obligations and specific obligations in the context of the 
transfer of detainees and arms transfers). It is argued that, taken together, 
these rules form the contour of an overarching framework of mutual com-
pliance among States cooperating in military operations, whereby each State 
has a duty to ensure, and interest in ensuring, that partners respectively abide 
by their international obligations. 
The scope of this article is limited to collaboration amongst States, and 
does not address potential issues of partnered warfare that arise when coop-
erating with non-State actors.2 Nor does it analyze specific questions at-
tached to collaboration in the framework of an international organization 
                                                                                                                      
1. International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10 at 26–30 (Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts) and 31–143 (General Commentary) (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEARBOOK 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 
(Part 2) [hereinafter ARSIWA]. 
2. On aid or assistance to non-State actors, see Ryan Goodman & Vladyslav Lanovoy, 
State Responsibility for Assisting Armed Groups: A Legal Risk Analysis, JUST SECURITY (December 
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such as the United Nations or NATO.3 Instead, this article focuses on the 
various forms and degrees of military cooperation amongst States, and ana-
lyzes how international obligations that arise in relation to the conduct of 
partners result in limits and incentives on partnered warfare among States. 
Part II introduces the different forms that military partnerships can take, 
and the varied degrees of cooperation it can involve. Part III examines in 
detail the myriad of negative and positive obligations that arise in connection 
with the conduct of military partners and reflects on the need to ascertain 
the proper balance between permissive approaches that may lead to co-re-
sponsibility and precautionary approaches that would hinder effective coop-
eration. Part IV argues that this collection of obligations forms the contours 
of a framework for mutual compliance amongst partnering States. Part V 
concludes. 
 
II. MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS AMONG STATES: FORMS AND DEGREES OF 
COOPERATION 
 
In contemporary warfare, States routinely form partnerships to conduct mil-
itary operations, and bilateral State-to-State armed conflicts have become the 
exception. Collaborative military operations in the form of alliances or coa-
litions are not a new phenomenon, as the strategic advantages of joining 
forces in order to achieve common objectives have long been utilized.4 In 
                                                                                                                      
22, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/35790/state-responsibility-aiding-assisting-armed-
groups-legal-risk-analysis/; Vladyslav Lanovoy, The Use of Force by Non-State Actors and the 
Limits of Attribution of Conduct, 28 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 563, 579–
85 (2017). For an international relations perspective on State support to non-state armed 
groups, see Belgin San Akca, Supporting Non-State Armed Groups: A Resort to Illegality?, 32 
JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 589 (2009); Brian Katz, Imperfect Proxies: The Pros and Perils 
of Partnering with Non-State Actors for CT, CSIS BRIEFS (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.csis.org/ 
analysis/imperfect-proxies-pros-and-perils-partnering-non-state-actors-ct. 
3. For an overview of obligations at play in the context of partnered warfare involving 
an international organization, see Berenice Boutin, Responsibility in Connection with the Conduct 
of Military Partners, 56 MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR REVIEW 57, 71–73, 76–77 
(2018). For a thorough analysis of issues of aid or assistance by international organizations 
in the context of in military operations, see MAGDALENA PACHOLSKA, COMPLICITY AND 
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND HUMANITARIAN LAW VIOLATIONS IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS (2020). 
4. Richard R. Baxter, Constitutional Forms and Some Legal Problems of International Military 
Command, 29 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 325, 325 (1952); MULTINA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS, ALLIANCES, AND INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COOPERATION: PAST 
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the past decades, however, partnered warfare in the context of evolving bat-
tlefields has grown into increasingly complex and varied modalities, ranging 
from distant material support to joint operational missions. 
Military partnerships are an ad hoc form of military collaboration, where 
precise functioning and modalities are negotiated on a case-by-case basis by 
participating States.5 Notwithstanding this intrinsic diversity, it is useful to 
present some general features that are commonly found in practice. Two 
broad categories can be distinguished, depending on whether States collab-
orate in the battlefield by forming a close or loose partnership, or whether 
cooperation occurs through forms of support that do not involve direct par-
ticipation in operational activities. 
The first category, partnerships at the operational level, includes coali-
tions of States as well as punctual joint missions. Coalitions can adopt an 
integrated multinational command, whereby troops are under the opera-
tional control of a multinational force commander who acts under the joint 
authority of all participating States, and where organs of each State are inte-
grated at all levels of the chain of command.6 In other cases, coalitions follow 
a “lead nation” model, where one of the coalition States leads the multina-
tional command structure. Typically, the lead State provides the largest con-
tingent, the top officers, and a large part of the facilities and equipment. The 
command structure is still unified, but it is not fully integrated, as the lead 
State formally has a preponderant role in the chain of command.7 In recent 
                                                                                                                      
AND FUTURE (Robert S. Rush & William W. Epley eds., 2006); NAVAL COALITION WAR-
FARE: FROM THE NAPOLEONIC WAR TO OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (Bruce A. Elleman 
& S.C.M. Paine eds., 2008). 
5. By contrast, multinational military operations under the aegis of an international or-
ganization follow established patterns. For U.N. peacekeeping operations, see U.N. DE-
PARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, POL-
ICY DIRECTIVE ON AUTHORITY, COMMAND AND CONTROL IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE-
KEEPING OPERATIONS (2008). 
6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations 1 March 2019, 
¶ II-5, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_16.pdf. For in-
stance, the Allied Powers in World War II had adopted a unified multinational structure 
with authority vested in a Supreme Commander, see GORDON A. HARRISON, UNITED 
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, at 105 (1951). 
7. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-16, The Army in Multinational Operations ¶ 2-
12 (2014); Australia Defence Headquarters, ADDP 00.3, Multinational Operations ¶ 4-3 
(2011). For instance, the coalition of International Force East Timor (INTERFET) oper-
ated under a multinational command dominated by Australia. See A. Ryan, The Strong Lead-
Nation Model in an Ad-Hoc Coalition of the Willing: Operation Stabilize in East Timor 9 INTERNA-
TIONAL PEACEKEEPING 23 (2002). 
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years, models of command structure in coalitions have become further di-
verse, such as operations against ISIL in Syria and Iraq conducted by multi-
ple States seemingly without a clearly unified command.8 It is also frequent 
for the intervening State to collaborate to some extent with the host State, 
on the basis of distinct command. Finally, partnerships at the operational 
level can take the form of punctual joint missions. This occurs where parallel 
military operations under distinct command punctually cooperate for a spe-
cific mission. For instance, in Afghanistan, U.S. forces of Operation Endur-
ing Freedom carried out air strikes in support of NATO-led ISAF forces.9 
The second category concerns logistical support, which designates less 
direct forms of military support, stopping short of direct involvement in of-
fensive combat operations. Logistical support can take a wide range of 
shapes, including the transport of another State’s troops and equipment, air-
to-air refueling, aerial or naval surveillance, sharing of information, allowing 
the use of military bases or air space, providing medical facilities and services, 
lending assets, providing weapons, or financing.10 For instance, the NATO-
led 2011 bombing campaign in Libya was carried out with the logistical sup-
port of several States. These States provided intelligence or aerial refueling 
but did not engage directly in air-to-ground operations.11 Even though it usu-
ally involves a relatively limited participation of the supporting State, logisti-
cal support can be crucial to ensure the efficient deployment and functioning 
of an operation.12 
                                                                                                                      
8. For instance, next to Operation Inherent Resolve led by the United States, France 
deployed Operation Chammal. See Ministère des Armées, Opération Chammal, Dossier de Refe-
rence, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/chammal/dossier-de-reference/operation-
chammal (last updated Nov. 3, 2011). 
9. Rebecca Barber, The Proportionality Equation: Balancing Military Objectives with Civilian 
Lives in the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan 15 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 467, 
490 (2010). 
10. See Georg Nolte & Helmut Philipp Aust, Equivocal Helpers – Complicit States, Mixed 
Messages and International Law, 58 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 1, 
2–4 (2009); Natalino Ronzitti, Italy’s Non-Belligerency During the Iraqi War, in INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 197, 201 (Maurizio 
Ragazzi ed., 2005). 
11. ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, LESSONS OFFERED FROM THE LIBYA AIR CAM-
PAIGN (2012); John A. Tirpak, Lessons from Libya, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, Dec. 2011, 
https://www.airforcemag.com/article/1211libya/. 
12. See, e.g., Gabe Starosta, Mission to Mali, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, Nov. 2013, 
https://www.airforcemag.com/article/1113mali/ (noting the logistical assistance provided 
by the U.S. Air Force to France’s deployment in Mali in 2013, which included the transport 
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The different forms of partnerships—whether at the operational or lo-
gistical level—and the different degree of cooperation they imply—ranging 
from loose affiliation to close cooperation—will be of relevance when ap-
plying international obligations that arise in relation to the conduct of part-
ners. Indeed, as will be explained below, a number of obligations take into 
account the degree of knowledge of the conduct of other States, as well as 
the capacity to influence this conduct, and, incidentally, the causal proximity 
between the respective actions and omissions of different partners. 
 
III. THE INTERPLAY OF NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS CON-
NECTED TO THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY PARTNERS 
 
Against the background of the varied forms of military partnerships, this 
article examines international obligations that apply to a State’s conduct in 
relation to the conduct of another State. Such obligations are triggered by 
the combination of an act or omission of one State that is related to the act 
or omission of another State. In essence, they consist of obligations to not 
actively help, nor blindly let others do what a State could not lawfully do 
itself. Accordingly, this Part proceeds as follows. Section A introduces key 
conceptual distinctions relevant to this discussion, before Section B surveys 
the range of negative obligations States must take not to facilitate or contrib-
ute to wrongful conduct undertaken by partner States. Section C examines 
positive obligations to ensure that partners refrain from engaging in wrong-
ful conduct and Section D looks to the interplay of these obligations to high-
light the difficult balance that military partners must strike between overly 
permissive and unduly precautionary approaches. 
 
A. Clarifying Some Conceptual Distinctions with Practical Relevance 
 
1. Negative and Positive Obligations 
 
A first and crucial distinction must be made between negative and positive 
obligations. Negative obligations require refraining from engaging in certain 
conduct, while positive obligations require actively taking steps toward a cer-
tain result. Negative obligations are breached when the prohibition is not 
respected (obligation of result), while positive obligations are only breached 
                                                                                                                      
of French troops and cargo into Mali, as well as air-to-air refueling, and was characterized 
as “nothing less than essential in allowing the operation to proceed”). 
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through a lack of due diligence (obligation of means).13 In the context of 
partnered warfare and the obligations examined below, negative and positive 
obligations are two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, States must 
refrain from actively facilitating or contributing to violations by partners, and 
on the other hand they must take steps to prevent violations by others and 
not passively let partners commit wrongful conduct. Thus, there is a fine line 
between undue facilitation resulting in wrongful aid or assistance, and insuf-
ficient efforts in seeking compliance by partners. 
 
2. Primary and Secondary Norms 
 
A second important distinction is between primary and secondary norms. 
Primary norms are substantive in nature and prescribe the content of specific 
international obligations to engage in or refrain from certain conduct. Sec-
ondary norms focus on responsibility and provide the conditions for, and 
legal consequences of, engaging in a conduct that is against what is pre-
scribed by substantive primary norms.14 This distinction is, however, far 
from clear. Notably, while the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States 
primarily focus on secondary norms and the consequences of a breach of 
international norms,15 they also include a number of rules that have a primary 
dimension.16 In particular, Chapter IV of Part I of the ARSIWA, “Respon-
sibility of a State in Connection with the Act of Another State,” contains 
general secondary rules of responsibility that at least partially qualify as pri-
mary norms, as they prescribe that a State incurs responsibility if it assists or 
controls another State in violating the obligations of the latter State.17 These 
rules concern derived responsibility, in the sense that responsibility arises in 
connection with a violation of international law by another State, rather than 
solely out of one State’s own conduct.18 Secondary rules of derived respon-
sibility thereby come very close to certain negative primary obligations that 
                                                                                                                      
13. Dinah Shelton & Ariel Gould, Positive and Negative Obligations, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 562, 562 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013). 
14. ARSIWA, supra note 1, General Commentary, ¶ 2; Norberto Bobbio, Nouvelles Ré-
flexions sur les Normes Primaires et Secondaires, in LA REGLE DE DROIT 104 (Ch. Perelman ed., 
1971). 
15. ARSIWA, supra note 1, General Commentary, ¶ 1. 
16. JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 339 (2013). 
17. ARSIWA, supra note 1, art. 16 (Aid or assistance in the commission of an interna-
tionally wrongful act), art. 17 (Direction and control exercised over the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act), art. 18 (Coercion of another State). 
18. Boutin, supra note 3, at 62–63. 
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are analyzed in the next Section. While formally part of the body of second-
ary norms, rules of derived responsibility concern not only ex post conse-
quences of a breach, but also require States to ensure ex ante that they do not 
facilitate or contribute to wrongful conduct committed by another State. 
 
3. Lex Specialis and Lex Generalis 
 
A third distinction, particularly relevant in the context of this article, is the 
distinction between lex generalis and lex specialis. Rules of the ARSIWA form 
a lex generalis, applicable to any matter of international law,19 while more spe-
cialized rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) and other bodies of 
law, such as international human rights law or international law regulating 
the arms trade, function as lex specialis. Traditionally, lex specialis prevails over 
lex generalis in case of conflict, but the general rules are not displaced merely 
because specific rules on the same subject exist.20 Rather, general and specific 
rules that follow the same direction can be interpreted alongside one another. 
The lex specialis can be seen as a particular application of a more general rule, 
while the lex generalis provides orientation on the general goals.21 Accordingly, 
ILC rules and primary norms can be interpreted together, and in combina-
tion lead to identifying an overarching regime for military partnerships. 
 
B. Obligations not to Facilitate or Contribute to Wrongful Conduct by Partners 
 
In the context of military partnerships, negative obligations in relation to the 
conduct of others play a key role. Partner States are bound by a number of 
obligations pursuant to which collaboration with another can be wrongful. 
It is thus critical for partners to assess these rules and to agree on the mo-
dalities and limits of collaboration prior to engaging in military action. 
Within the rules of State responsibility, Article 16 ARSIWA provides: 
 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an interna-
tionally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: 
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internation-
ally wrongful act; and 
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. 
                                                                                                                      
19. ARSIWA supra note 1, art. 55; General Commentary, ¶ 5. 
20. Id. Commentary to art. 55, ¶ 4. 
21. HELMUT PHILIPP AUST, COMPLICITY AND THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
417 (2011). 
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Numerous commentators have discussed the precise content and nature of 
Article 16.22 While some specific modalities of the provision, in particular its 
subjective element, remain unsettled,23 it is accepted that Article 16 embodies 
customary international law.24 For the purpose of this article, what is im-
portant to note is that Article 16 can be interpreted as a primary obligation 
not to knowingly aid or assist another State in breaching a substantive obli-
gation that is binding on both the aiding and the aided States. The require-
ment of knowledge that the assistance would facilitate the commission of a 
wrongful conduct is formally one of actual (rather than constructive) 
knowledge. Nonetheless, the existence of knowledge on the part of the aid-
ing State can be demonstrated by inference from factual circumstances.25 
The “double opposability” requirement indicates that aid or assistance is 
only wrongful if the aided State commits an internationally wrongful act (de-
fined in Article 2 ARSIWA as a conduct attributed to that State and in breach 
of its obligations), and if the aiding State is bound by the same or an equiv-
alent obligation (Article 16(b) ARSIWA).26 Therefore, States partnering in 
warfare need to ensure collaboration does not result in unlawful assistance 
that would engage their responsibility. In particular, States that collaborate 
only indirectly through the provision of logistical support could engage their 
responsibility if their support facilitates or contributes to the commission of 
                                                                                                                      
22. See especially AUST, supra note 21; VLADYSLAV LANOVOY, COMPLICITY AND ITS LIM-
ITS IN THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2016); John Quigley, Complicity in 
International Law: A New Direction in the Law of State Responsibility, 57 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (1987); HARRIET MOYNIHAN, CHATHAM HOUSE, AIDING AND 
ASSISTING: CHALLENGES IN ARMED CONFLICT AND COUNTER TERRORISM (2016), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/aiding-and-assisting-challenges-armed-con-
flict-and-counterterrorism. 
23. AUST, supra note 21, at 377; Vladyslav Lanovoy, Complicity in an Internationally Wrong-
ful Act, in PRINCIPLES OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN AP-
PRAISAL OF THE STATE OF THE ART 134, 152 (André Nollkaemper & Ilias Plakokefalos eds., 
2014); Bernhard Graefrath, Complicity in the Law of International Responsibility, 2 REVUE BELGE 
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 371, 375 (1996). 
24. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 420 
(Feb. 26). 
25. MOYNIHAN, supra note 22, at 12–14; André Nollkaemper et al., Guiding Principles of 
Shared Responsibility in International Law, 30 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
15, 42–43 (2020). 
26. See Lanovoy, supra note 23, at 159–60 (considering this requirement “overly formal-
istic”). 
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wrongful conduct on the ground. Although partner States will to some ex-
tent not be bound by the same substantive obligations, the obligation not to 
aid or assist in violations is relevant at least with regard to customary rules 
of international law applying to armed conflict. 
The ARSIWA contains an additional rule on aid or assistance, covering 
specifically cases of violations of jus cogens. Article 41(2) ARSIWA, in con-
junction with Article 40 ARSIWA, provides that no State shall render aid or 
assistance in maintaining a situation created by a serious breach of obliga-
tions under peremptory norms of general international law.27 This rule is par-
ticularly relevant to military operations, which may involve violations of the 
prohibition on the use force under the principles of the U.N. Charter and 
customary international law. If a military operation was initiated in breach of 
the prohibition on the use force, further participation and support by other 
States could violate Article 41. Here again, prior to partnering each State 
must assess the legal risks that collaboration could result in a serious viola-
tion of international law and weigh these risks accordingly. 
The notion of wrongful aid or assistance to another State is also found 
within IHL. Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides, 
“[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect 
for the present Convention in all circumstances,”28 and has been interpreted 
as including not only an internal dimension pursuant to which each State has 
the obligation not to engage itself in violations of IHL, but also an external 
dimension,29 which is particularly relevant in the context of partnered war-
fare. Accordingly, States have a duty to ensure that other States (and espe-
cially partner States) abide by the Conventions, which itself implies a nega-
tive obligation not to aid or assist other States in IHL violations.30 
Nearly all forms of military collaboration examined in Part II can qualify 
as aid or assistance, and it is therefore crucial for partners to evaluate whether 
                                                                                                                      
27. See ARSIWA, supra note 1, Commentary to art. 41, ¶ 11. 
28. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
the Armed Forces in the Field art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. 
29. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST 
GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION 
OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶¶ 153, 156 (2016) [here-
inafter COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION]; Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions Revisited: Protecting 
Collective Interests, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 67 (2000). 
30. COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 29, ¶ 158; 1 CUS-
TOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 144, at 509 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts and 
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL]; AUST, supra note 21, at 388. 
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other States are and remain operating within established boundaries of IHL. 
It should also be noted that the threshold of knowledge on the part of the 
aiding State under common Article 1 is lower than with Article 16 ARSIWA31 
and more akin to constructive knowledge. Under common Article 1, an aid-
ing State can engage its responsibility not only if it actually knew, but also if 
it reasonably should have known, that a partner State was committing IHL 
violations. According to the 2016 ICRC Commentary on the First Geneva 
Convention, “[i]n the event of multinational operations, common Article 1 
thus requires High Contracting Parties to opt out of a specific operation if 
there is an expectation, based on facts or knowledge of past patterns, that it 
would violate the Conventions, as this would constitute aiding or assisting 
violations.”32 Although this interpretation of the external dimension of com-
mon Article 1 as a binding obligation is not fully accepted by all States,33 it 
has gained ample support in the past decades and is now the majority view.34 
Thus, it cannot be ignored in partnered warfare, as it is very likely that at 
least some of the partnering States will adopt and seek to abide by this inter-
pretation of common Article 1. 
Similarly, in the field of international human rights law, the duty of each 
State to secure human rights has a well-established external dimension, 
whereby States must respect human rights, but also protect human rights 
from violations by other States.35 Hence, assistance provided by a State to 
                                                                                                                      
31. COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 29, ¶ 160. 
32. Id. ¶ 161. 
33. Most notoriously, the United States takes the view that the duty to ensure respect 
by other States is more of a policy consideration than a legally binding obligation. See, e.g., 
Brian Egan, International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign: Some Observation, 
92 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 235 (2016) (providing speech as prepared for delivery by 
Brian Egan, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, 110th Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Society of International Law, Washington, D.C., April 1, 2016); Oona Hathaway & 
Zachary Manfredi, The State Department Adviser Signals a Middle Road on Common Article 1, JUST 
SECURITY (April 12, 2016),  https://www.justsecurity.org/30560/state-department-adviser-
signals-middle-road-common-article-1/. 
34. Birgit Kessler, The Duty to “Ensure Respect” Under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Con-
ventions: Its Implications on International and Non-International Armed Conflicts, 44 GERMAN YEAR-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 498, 498 (2001); Boisson de Chazournes & Condorelli, 
supra note 29, at 70; Carlo Focarelli, Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap 
Bubble?, 21 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 125, 127 (2010). 
35. For a historical analysis of the “respect, protect, and fulfill” concept in human rights 
law, see Ida Elisabeth Koch, Dichotomies, Trichotomies or Waves of Duties?, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW REVIEW 81 (2005). 
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conduct that results in human rights violations by another State can consti-
tute a breach of the former State’s obligations to protect individuals within 
its jurisdiction from human rights violations by third parties.36 While IHL 
remains the primary legal framework applicable to military operations, it has 
become widely accepted that human rights obligations do not automatically 
cease to apply in time of armed conflict.37 An in-depth analysis of human 
rights law applicability in armed conflict is beyond the scope of this paper,38 
but it can simply be recalled that core human rights law obligations apply, 
albeit with some qualifications, to the conduct of military obligations. The 
human rights dimension is also particularly relevant to scenarios of logistical 
assistance provided by States that do not formally take part in combat oper-
ations, and thereby operate within the human rights framework. 
Significant practice from the European Court of Human Rights exists in 
the context of partnered warfare, most notably in relation to coalition oper-
ations in Iraq between 2004 and 2009, and the indirect participation of Eu-
ropean States in the U.S. rendition program.39 Interestingly, there is no for-
                                                                                                                      
36. U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment No. 36, Article 6 (Right 
to Life), 3 September 2019, CCPR/C/GC/35, ¶ 63; AUST, supra note 21, at 415; Maarten 
den Heijer, Shared Responsibility Before the European Court of Human Rights, 60 NETHERLANDS 
INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 411, 422 (2013). 
37. See, e.g., Noam Lubell, Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict, 87 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 737 (2005). For the intersection of human 
rights law and international humanitarian law in non-international armed conflict, see Marco 
Sassòli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship between International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed Con-
flicts, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 599 (2008). 
38. U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment No. 31, The Nature of 
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶ 11; Heike Krieger, A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 JOURNAL OF 
CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 265 (2006); JENS DAVID OHLIN, THEORETICAL BOUNDA-
RIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2016). On the extraterritorial application 
of human rights obligations, see MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011); see also Sigrun Skogly, 
Extraterritorial Obligations and the Obligation to Protect, 47 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 217 (2016). 
39. See, e.g., Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08 (2010) 
(ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-97575; Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, 
App. No. 27021/08 (2011) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105612; El-
Masri v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App No. 39630/09 (2012); Nasr and 
Ghali v. Italy, App No. 44883/09 (2016). 
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mal requirement of double opposability within the framework of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Therefore, States party to the 
ECHR can engage their responsibility if they provide support or contribute 
to human rights violations by non-ECHR States. As will be further examined 
in Part IV, this contributes to the emergence of a broader framework for 
mutual compliance among military partners, where obligations binding on 
some of the partners will have implications on the functioning of the part-
nership as a whole. It is also noteworthy that the European Court of Human 
Rights applies a standard of constructive knowledge (“knew or ought to have 
known”) in cases concerning assistance to human rights violations.40 
Other more specific obligations not to aid or assist another State can be 
mentioned. With regard to the transfer of arms or ammunitions to a military 
partner, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) provides that a State “shall not au-
thorize any transfer of conventional arms . . . if it has knowledge at the time 
of authorization that the arms . . . would be used in the commission of . . . 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.”41 If a State opts to provide sup-
port to another State by allowing the latter to use military bases, it should be 
mindful of the general obligation “not to allow knowingly its territory to be 
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”42 Also relevant in the 
context of partnered warfare is Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, 
which provides for an obligation not to “extradite a person to another State 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he [or she] would be 
in danger of being subjected to torture.”43 In the context of extraordinary 
rendition, States that do not directly engage in rendition but provide some 
assistance to the extradition of individuals could be providing wrongful as-
sistance in breach of Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. 
 
C. Obligations to Ensure that Partners Refrain from Engaging in Wrongful Conduct 
 
Positive obligations provide the opposite and complementary dimension to 
negative obligations not to assist in wrongful conduct by partner States. They 
                                                                                                                      
40. El-Masri, supra note 39, ¶ 198. 
41. The Arms Trade Treaty art. 6(3), Apr. 2, 2013, 3013 U.N.T.S. (entered into force 
Dec. 24, 2014). 
42. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, ¶ 22 (Apr. 9). 
43. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
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require not merely refraining from assisting in other’s violations of interna-
tional law, but in taking proactive steps to ensure that partners do not engage 
in wrongful conduct. 
Further to the negative obligation not to assist in IHL violations, com-
mon Article 1 has a positive external dimension which involves an obligation 
to “take proactive steps to bring violations of the Conventions to an end and 
to bring an erring Party to a conflict back to an attitude of respect for the 
Conventions, in particular by using their influence on that Party.”44 The ex-
ternal positive dimension of the duty to ensure respect for IHL is an obliga-
tion of diligence which formally applies toward all States. Accordingly, the 
ICRC CIHL Study finds, “[States] must exert their influence, to the degree 
possible, to stop violations of international humanitarian law.”45 This rule 
will have specific implications in the case of partnered warfare, where closely 
collaborating States have a greater ability to influence the conduct of each 
other.46 For instance, States participating in a coalition under a unified com-
mand will have a significant capacity to influence the conduct of each other, 
and therefore an obligation to do so in order to ensure respect for IHL and 
prevent violations. By contrast, States providing limited support have a lesser 
degree of influence yet remain bound to do what is reasonably possible. For 
instance, logistical support that is particularly crucial and necessary to an op-
eration should be withdrawn in case of knowledge of wrongful conduct. 
Next to the extent of capacity to influence the conduct of others, a cri-
terion of reasonable foreseeability applies, whereby the “obligation is not 
limited to stopping ongoing violations but includes an obligation to prevent 
violations when there is a foreseeable risk that they will be committed and 
to prevent further violations in case they have already occurred.”47 This ele-
ment of foreseeability in positive obligations pairs with the requirements of 
constructive knowledge in negative obligations. Indeed, constructive 
knowledge and foreseeability together point at a need to avoid “willful blind-
ness” toward the conduct of partners, and to seek information rather than 
remaining passive and oblivious to the eventuality of violations.48 
In addition to the general positive obligation to ensure compliance with 
IHL, the Third Geneva Convention contains specific obligations to seek 
                                                                                                                      
44. COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 29, ¶ 164. 
45. CIHL, supra note 30, r. 144, at 509. 
46. COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 29, ¶ 166. 
47. Id. ¶ 164. 
48. MOYNIHAN, supra note 22, at 14–15. 
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compliance in IHL for the transfer of individuals in custody. Article 12 pro-
vides that prisoners of war may only be transferred by one State to another 
after the former “has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of [the other 
State] to apply the Convention.”49 According to the 2020 ICRC Commen-
tary, this requires the transferring State to actively inquire and seek to obtain 
information to verify the willingness and ability of the other State to apply 
these safeguards.50 The Commentary also indicates that a lack of willingness 
and ability on part of a State could be implied from a “poor record of com-
pliance with its humanitarian obligations.”51 Further, Article 12 stipulates 
that, if the State to which the detainee was transferred fails to comply with 
IHL standards, the transferring State must “take effective measures to cor-
rect the situation or shall request the return of the prisoners of war.”52 Breach 
of this positive continuing obligation by the transferring State could engage 
its derived responsibility in relation to the mistreatment of the detainee by 
the other State.53 A similar provision addressing the transfer of other pro-
tected persons is found in Article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.54 
In international human rights law, the obligation to protect from human 
rights violations also includes a positive obligation to take reasonable steps 
to seek compliance and prevent abuses by others.55 In a case before the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights concerning an individual abducted by Mac-
edonia and surrendered to the United States as part of the U.S. rendition 
program, the Court held that the ECHR “requires States to take measures 
designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected 
to [human rights violations]” and “[t]he State’s responsibility may therefore 
be engaged where the authorities fail to take reasonable steps to avoid a risk 
                                                                                                                      
49. Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 12, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]. 
50. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, UPDATED COMMENTARY ON 
THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949 ¶ 1534 (2020) [hereinafter UPDATED COM-
MENTARY ON THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION]. 
51. Id. 
52. Geneva Convention III, supra note 49, art. 12. 
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of ill-treatment [by third parties].”56 Although Macedonia did not itself com-
mit torture or other inhumane treatment, it was found responsible for ac-
tively facilitating, and failing to take measures that would have prevented, 
wrongful conduct by the United States.57 
Finally, another relevant positive obligation in the context of partnered 
warfare is found in Article 7 ATT, which applies to the transfer of arms not 
prohibited under Article 6 ATT, and imposes a requirement to assess prior 
to any transfer the potential that arms or ammunitions could be used to com-
mit or facilitate serious violations of international law.58 
 
D. Striking the Balance Between Permissive and Precautionary Approaches 
 
In view of the constellation of negative and positive obligations and layers 
of rules that come into play in relation to the conduct of military partners, 
States need to strike a difficult balance between permissive and precautionary 
approaches. Permissive approaches, where military collaboration and sup-
port are decided without sufficient consideration of negative and positive 
obligations, risk significant legal consequences in terms of State responsibil-
ity for wrongful assistance or failure to ensure respect. Precautionary ap-
proaches, on the other hand, where collaboration is subject to excessively 
strict conditions, or altogether avoided, hinder the effectiveness of military 
operations and ultimately of achieving common objectives, including the 
maintenance of peace and security. When engaging in partnered warfare, 
States must find an equilibrium within the complementary ensemble of neg-
ative and positive obligations that both require States to refrain from coop-
eration that would actively facilitate or contribute to wrongful conduct by 
others and encourage States not to ignore other’s wrongful conduct and to 
actively cooperate toward preventing violations. 
While it has been occasionally argued that excessive legal constraints on 
(partnered) warfare are detrimental to achieving strategic objectives,59 typi-
cally it is not the legal framework presented in this article that impedes inter-
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59. For an example of this argument in the United Kingdom, see Richard Ekins, Jona-
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national military cooperation. Rather, it is the unwillingness of States to en-
gage with it and to closely evaluate their respective obligations and interpre-
tations, so as to agree on a framework for collaboration that satisfies both 
compliance with core international norms and operational efficacy. On the 
contrary, failure of certain partners to seek alignment and compliance may 
result in responsibility being attached to other partners, which would in the 
future be reluctant to participate in collaborative military operations with in-
cautious States. And it indeed seems to be increasingly acknowledged by 
States that their mutual interest lies in a compliance-based approach to mili-
tary cooperation that safeguards both the international rule of law and com-
mon strategic goals. Thus, in his 2016 remarks to the American Society of 
International Law, U.S. Department of State legal adviser Brian Egan in-
sisted that the compliance of each military partner with international law “is 
essential to building and maintaining our international coalition,” and that 
doing so “enhances rather than compromises our military effectiveness.”60 
The question now turns to how best to achieve this result. 
 
IV. TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL COMPLIANCE IN PARTNERED 
WARFARE 
 
Taken together, international obligations in relation to the conduct of mili-
tary partners—and their criteria of knowledge, foreseeability, and capacity—
form the contours of an emerging overarching framework for mutual com-
pliance. Military partners cannot blindly engage in partnered warfare and 
only pay attention to individual compliance with their own obligations. They 
need to assess and interpret alongside their respective obligations in relation 
to the conduct of others, which together will lead toward ensuring mutual 
compliance in partnered warfare. 
The duty to seek mutual compliance lies at the intersection of positive 
and negative obligations that come into play in partnered warfare.61 In each 
of the obligations examined in this article, criteria of knowledge or foresee-
ability of the conduct of others, as well as capacity to influence that conduct 
are key. In the context of military operations, which, as seen in Part II, in-
volve various forms of cooperation, the degrees of knowledge and capacity 
to influence, and thereby the thresholds for breach of obligations, will vary 
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depending on the extent of collaboration. For instance, military partners 
which closely collaborate in a coalition under unified command will presum-
ably have more opportunities to acquire knowledge of each other’s conduct 
and to influence this conduct. By contrast, in coalitions under the lead-nation 
model, partners will have less capacity to influence the conduct of the lead 
State. This is neither straightforward nor linear, as limited degrees of coop-
eration, such as logistical support, can yield high degrees of influence when 
a State provides crucial assistance (for example, the use of military bases that 
are essential to a bombing campaign) and holds the option of withdrawing 
support. Knowledge will also vary depending on forms and degrees of co-
operation. Yet limited cooperation does not absolve a State from its duty to 
seek information or allow it to blindly cooperate with other States. This is 
particularly true with obligations that include criteria of constructive 
knowledge or foreseeability. Essentially, the relationship between degrees of 
knowledge and capacity on one hand, and forms of military cooperation on 
the other hand, is one of causality. A military partner will risk engaging its 
responsibility if its own actions or omissions causally contribute to the 
wrongful conduct of another State.62 
To achieve mutual compliance as well as interoperability, States partner-
ing in military operations need to—prior to engaging in cooperation—assess 
respective interests, views, and obligations, and agree on permissible conduct 
and limitations within the partnership. In practice, States seeking to ensure 
mutual compliance in military collaboration can and have made use of agree-
ments—including status of forces agreements, rules of engagement, or mem-
oranda of understanding—in which they reach agreed standards, expecta-
tions, and modalities of cooperation.63 While undoubtedly commendable, 
formal agreements do not offer full-proof protection against the legal risks 
or the challenges of military collaboration. Dialogue between partners needs 
to be ongoing and iterative, and written agreements do not relieve States 
from their continuing obligations to seek compliance from partners.64 As an 
operation evolves and knowledge on the conduct of others develops, States 
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need to reassess the modalities of collaboration. As a more general point, it 
can be noted that the respective interpretations and understandings put for-
ward by different States in this context can also usefully result in a clarifica-
tion, and possibly a development or crystallization, of applicable legal norms. 
When seeking to reach agreement and find common grounds on legal 
boundaries, States will usually partially be bound by different obligations and 
often put forward different legal interpretations. Yet, in the context of mili-
tary collaboration, these differences will be mitigated by a number of factors. 
As discussed in this article, when it comes to obligations that arise in relation 
to the conduct of others, obligations binding on only some of the partners 
will have implications on the functioning of the partnership as a whole. Alt-
hough partners are bound by different obligations, the States with stricter 
obligations will be reluctant to collaborate in the absence of guarantees that 
their own responsibility will not risk being engaged in relation to the conduct 
of partners with more relaxed obligations. Even when collaboration only 
concerns limited support, States will be wary of providing assistance to the 
operations of another State that questionably fits the former State’s obliga-
tions. Indeed, as seen in practice, victims that cannot obtain redress from a 
principal wrongdoer can turn to States indirectly involved in the wrongful 
conduct to claim reparation.65 As a result, it will often be in the best interest 
of all parties to attain a shared understating that aligns with the highest com-
mon denominator. 
Combined with associated practice and policy, the various legal obliga-
tions examined in this article—secondary and primary, negative and positive, 
general and specific—point toward the emergence of an overarching legal 
regime of mutual compliance. Under this analysis, it is in the best legal and 
policy interest of each State, as well as of the international community, not 
to allow other States involved in military collaboration to breach obligations 
binding on some or all of the military partners. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
When engaging in partnered warfare, States must carefully assess and balance 
their international obligations, and thereby establish certain preconditions, 
for partnering. This article analyzed international obligations arising in rela-
tion to the conduct of other States, including secondary rules of the law of 
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State responsibility and primary norms of IHL and human rights law. Such 
obligations, which concern the conduct of one State in relation to another 
State, inevitably affect the commitments of partners, in part as they can trig-
ger the responsibility of a partner State in relation to conduct it did not di-
rectly commit. It is thus necessary for partnering States to assess the legal 
risks that collaboration could entail and to develop shared interpretations 
that can guide the modalities of the conduct of partnered warfare. 
Military collaboration can take different forms, ranging from close co-
operation to distant support. While international law has different implica-
tions depending on the extent of collaboration, it involves in each case neg-
ative obligations not to collaborate with others if it results in wrongful con-
duct, and positive obligations to take steps and exercise influence to foster 
compliance. Partnering States usually are bound by partly different obliga-
tions, but—because obligations discussed in this article arise in relation to 
the conduct of others—obligations binding on some partners have implica-
tions on the functioning of the partnership as a whole. Based on a detailed 
analysis of obligations and their respective thresholds and requirements, this 
article argued that, taken together, these rules form the contour of an over-
arching framework of mutual compliance among States cooperating in mili-
tary operations, whereby each State has a duty to ensure that partners respec-
tively abide by their international obligations. 
In sum, the mutual interest of States partnering in warfare lies in a com-
pliance-based approach to military cooperation that safeguards both the in-
ternational rule of law and common strategic goals. In seeking to achieve 
mutual compliance, States have the opportunity to align their legal interpre-
tations and polices toward the highest common denominator. 
 
